Explaining the Regional Heterogeneity of Poverty: Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia. by Sumarto, Sudarno et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Explaining the Regional Heterogeneity of
Poverty: Evidence from Decentralized
Indonesia.
Sudarno Sumarto and Marc Vothknecht and Laura Wijaya
SMERU Research Institute, European Commission, The World Bank
11. March 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57823/
MPRA Paper No. 57823, posted 14. August 2014 11:41 UTC
 Java
WORKING PAPER 
Explaining the Regional 
Heterogeneity of Poverty: Evidence 
from Decentralized Indonesia 
Sudarno Sumarto 
The SMERU Research Institute and 
National Team for the Acceleration of 
Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) 
 
Marc Vothknecht 
European Commission 
 
Laura Wijaya 
TNP2K 
 WORKING PAPER 
 
Explaining the Regional Heterogeneity of 
Poverty: Evidence from Decentralized 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Team 
 
Sudarno Sumarto 
The SMERU Research Institute and 
National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) 
 
Marc Vothknecht 
European Commission 
 
Laura Wijaya 
TNP2K 
 
 
 
 
Editor 
Jamie Evans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute 
Jakarta 
April 2014 
 
 The findings, views, and interpretations published in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to any 
of the agencies providing financial support to The SMERU Research Institute. 
For further information on SMERU’s publications, phone 62-21-31936336; fax 62-21-31930850; e-mail smeru@smeru.or.id; or visit 
www.smeru.or.id. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sumarto, Sudarno  
Explaining the Regional Heterogeneity of Poverty: Evidence from Decentralized Indonesia / Sudarno Sumarto et al. --  
Jakarta: SMERU Research Institute, 2014 
 iv, 25 p. ; 30 cm. -- (SMERU Working Paper, April 2014) 
 ISBN 978-602-7901-11-7 
 1. poverty                                                  I.   SMERU 
                                                                 II.  Sumarto, Sudarno 
  
362.5 / DDC 22 
 
The SMERU Research Institute   i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
The authors are grateful to Hal Hill for encouraging and supporting this study. Asep Suryahadi, 
Adama Bah, Daniel Suryadarma, Indunil Da Silva, and Hector Salazar provided useful comments 
on an earlier draft. The remaining errors and weaknesses, however, are ours. 
  
The SMERU Research Institute   ii
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Explaining the Regional Heterogeneity of Poverty: Evidence from 
Decentralized Indonesiai 
 
Sudarno Sumartoii, Marc Vothknechtiii, and Laura Wijayaiv 
 
 
This study presents evidence from Indonesia on how the country’s recent periods of 
economic growth have contributed to poverty reduction at the regional level, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of decentralization. Over the past decade Indonesia has made significant 
progress in reducing poverty, from 23% of the population in 1999 to less than 12% in 2013. 
However, substantial differences in regional poverty are observed. In this paper, we discuss 
the factors that drive the evolution of poverty in a decentralized Indonesia, and relate 
kabupaten (district) performance in poverty reduction to a wide range of social, economic, and 
political characteristics within the area. The study finds gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita to be one of the major driving forces behind the decline in regional poverty. 
Additionally, results from a panel data analysis covering the period of 2005 to 2010 show that 
poverty has decreased in particular in those kabupaten with (i) a larger share of local leaders 
with secondary education; (ii) a higher average educational attainment; (iii) an established local 
office for the coordination of poverty reduction initiatives (TKPKD); (iv) a higher share of 
fiscal revenues; and (v) a higher share of urban population. Furthermore, there appears to be a 
positive link between regional inequality and poverty, suggesting that a successful poverty 
reduction strategy requires both economic growth and sound social policies. 
 
 
Keywords: poverty, decentralization, economic growth, Indonesia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the past decade Indonesia has made significant progress in reducing poverty. Based on 
official statistics produced by Statistics Indonesia (BPS), the poverty rate in Indonesia fell 
from 23.4% in 1999 to 11.37% in 2013. Viewed from any angle, this decrease is a tremendous 
achievement. However, this success story at the national level masks the existence of 
substantial regional differences. This paper focuses on this regional heterogeneity in poverty 
indicators, and relates kabupaten (district) performance in reducing poverty to the 
characteristics of the decentralization process, initiated in Indonesia after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
Decentralization involves the shifting of fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities 
from higher to lower levels of government and is expected to foster economic development 
and poverty reduction, if implemented within a comprehensive framework (World Bank, 
2013). Though around the world, countries, particularly those that are developing, have 
undertaken decentralization, the speed at which they have engaged in this process has varied. 
Generally, large countries such as China, India, and Brazil have adopted a more gradual 
approach in their reform for decentralization, whereas smaller countries more often chose a 
more radical, “Big Bang”, approach. Counter to this trend, Indonesia undertook the latter 
approach, made even more radical and given its vast geography, population, and cultural 
diversity (Hofman and Kaiser, 2002).  
 
Decentralization in Indonesia was initiated by the governance reforms advocated by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in combination with the financial 
assistance provided to the country following the Asian financial crisis (Green, 2005). Coupled 
with a simultaneous transformation into a democracy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, the 
decentralization process in Indonesia occurred with minimum preparation. By 1999, 
administrative and fiscal decentralization laws granted broad autonomy to the country’s 
regions for all but a few areas of responsibility explicitly reserved for the central 
government—including defense, security, justice, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary affairs, as 
well as religious affairs (World Bank, 2006). Subsequent laws expanded the responsibilities and 
functions of kabupaten governments while those of the central and provincial governments 
have been reduced (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Arifianto, 2004). Notably, political 
decentralization through a 2004 law introduced local direct elections while tightening central 
control over local budget and PAD decisions (World Bank, 2006).  
 
As a result of this fast-paced decentralization process, the Indonesian system lacks key 
institutional requirements for an effective management of the process, notably the absence of 
performance measures and an effective framework of constraints, as reflected in the 
shortcomings of the central government’s system of controls over local governments (World 
Bank 2006). Moreover, the division of responsibilities between the different levels of 
government is still unclear, clouding the accountability required to improve service delivery. 
An additional challenge stems from a uniform implementation of decentralization, which may 
not sufficiently accommodate regional differences. With a country as diverse as Indonesia, this 
can be an issue as each region differs in local government capacity and available resources. 
These factors undoubtedly have an effect, not only on the implementation of the national 
poverty reduction strategy, but also on the development of local poverty reduction initiatives. 
 
A review of experiences in 19 countries conducted by Jütting, Corsi, and Stockmayer (2005) 
finds that decentralization has actually led toimprovements in poverty reduction in only one-
thirdof the cases. The authors argue that lower middle income countries, which have literacy 
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rates above 80%, and whose political process is relatively open, are more likely to experience 
decreases in poverty following the adoption of decentralization measures. Overall, this study 
concludes that the decentralization process is more likely to have a positive impact on poverty 
if there is adequate commitment from the central government, if the involved actors have the 
financial and technical capacity, and if checks and balances are established at a local level to 
prevent rent-seeking and corruption.  
 
In this paper, we aim to uncover the factors associated with differing performances between 
kabupaten in reducing poverty. Through an analysis of a kabupaten-level panel dataset with 
annual observations for the period 2005 to 2010, we find support for the argument that the 
heterogeneity in poverty levels across kabupaten is associated with the heterogeneity in local 
governments’ resources and capacity. More specifically, poverty appears to have decreased 
more in kabupaten with (i) an established a local office for the coordination of poverty 
reduction initiatives (TKPKD); (ii) a higher share of fiscal revenues; (iii) a higher average 
educational attainment; (iv) a larger share of local leaders with secondary education; and (v) a 
higher share of urban population. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the observed 
heterogeneity in poverty across Indonesian regions between 2005 and 2010; section 3 
discusses the factors that are likely to be associated with different levels of poverty reduction 
at the local level. Section 4 and 5 present respectively the data and estimation strategy, and the 
results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
II. OBSERVED HETEROGENEITY IN REGIONAL POVERTY 
 
 
Indonesia has made significant strides in steadily reducing poverty since the Asian Financial 
Crisis. This result has been achieved through a combination of high economic growth and the 
implementation of poverty reduction programs by the Government in the past decade.  
However, a different picture emerges when looking at growth and poverty levels across 
Indonesian provinces and kabupaten (Hill, 1996, 2002; Tadjoeddin, Suharyo, and Mishra, 2001; 
ADB, 2001; Asra, 2000). Hill (2002) finds that the variance in poverty levels is increasing 
instead of converging. This is a cause of concern as an increase in inequality across kabupaten 
can bring social and political unrest, thereby reducing the impact of the central government’s 
overall poverty reduction strategy. 
 
At the provincial level, large disparities in the poverty headcount ratio can be observed. Today, 
densely populated provinces such as Jakarta (3.7%) and Bali (4.0%), have lower poverty levels 
than provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia such as Papua (30.7%) and West Papua 
(27.0%). Further disaggregating the heterogeneity in poverty, Figure 1 shows the poverty 
headcount at kabupaten level for 2005, the starting year of this paper’s empirical analysis. The 
highest incidence of poverty is observed in eastern Indonesia, in particular for the provinces 
of Papua (especially in the highland kabupaten) and West Papua, Maluku, and East Nusa 
Tenggara (NTT). In addition, there are large regional variations, with pockets of poverty also 
observed in richer Java and Sumatra. In fact, the absolute number of poor people is highest in 
Java, given its high population density 
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.
 
Figure 1. Poverty headcount at the kabupaten level, 2005 
 
A similar picture emerges when considering the severity of poverty, as measured by the 
poverty gap (Figure 2), with the highest poverty gap in the eastern part of the country. This 
geographic concentration of poverty can be due to geographic poverty traps (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2002; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2. Poverty gap at the kabupaten level, 2005 
 
Finally, Figure 3 maps the absolute changes in the poverty headcount ratio between 2005 and 
2010. Reflecting the trend towards convergence in poverty rates, regions with initial higher 
levels of poverty tend to experience a larger decrease in poverty. However, substantial 
heterogeneity remains in poverty levels and trends both across and within regions.  
 
 
Figure 3. Change in the poverty headcount at the kabupaten level, 2005–2010 
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III. REVIEW OF THE DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL 
PERFORMANCES IN REDUCING POVERTY 
 
 
Poverty reduction efforts require the availability of public income, but also the adequate use of 
this income to fund public services, as well as the possibility for citizens to participate in 
social, economic, and political decisions at the local, regional, and national levels (Sumarto, 
Suryahadi, and Arifianto, 2004). A priori, poverty reduction efforts can be supported or 
undermined by decentralization. In this section, we examine the factors associated with the 
heterogeneity in poverty levels, in the context of the decentralization that has been 
implemented in Indonesia for over a decade. First, we consider kabupaten governments’ 
capacities to generate income, their fiscal capability, as well as their ability to deliver services. 
Second, we discuss general governance aspects, and a recent institutional innovation 
introduced to enhance the capacity of local governments to implement poverty reduction 
policies. 
 
 
3.1 Income Generation Capacity at the Local Level 
 
Under the decentralization laws, kabupaten governments are given the legal authority to impose 
taxes and user service charges (retribusi) (ADB, 2010) as a source of income. Local revenue 
(pendapatan asli daerah, PAD) refers to the income generated directly by local governments 
through taxes and user service charges. The amount of PAD collected varies according to the 
ability of each kabupaten to generate income, which in turn affects local governments’ ability to 
provide services and poverty reduction initiatives for the population. On average, PAD 
represents 7% of kabupaten income; whereas the main source of income is still transfers from 
the central government, as discussed in the next section. 
 
In practice, however, local taxation is not currently formulated with incentives for 
development. A report from the University of Sydney finds that local governments have 
been harming the investment climate with complex and problematic regulations that often 
overlap with national regulations (Aten, 2011; Butt and Parsons, 2012). Between 2002 and 
2009, the Ministry of Home Affairs has cancelled 1,887 local regulations. Further, in 2010 
over 3,000 local regulations were revised and 407 found problematic. This figure continues 
to increase; in 2011, the Ministry revised 9,000 local regulations and found 351 problematic 
cases (Aten, 2011). Law No. 28/2009 on Regional Taxes and User Service Charges is argued 
to have failed to prevent counterproductive taxes that local governments have put in place 
to collect revenue, rather than to achieve policy objectives (Aten, 2011). This has 
discouraged investors at a time when Indonesia is in need of funding for its long-term 
development goals. The possibility for local governments to collect their own revenue must 
therefore be accompanied by rigorous and more efficient monitoring and control 
mechanisms from the central government, in order to prevent local taxation from creating 
distortions that discourage investment and economic activity. 
 
Lastly, the new fiscal framework also allows regions to keep a given share of the revenues 
generated from the natural resources in their areas (World Bank, 2003). Kabupaten income is 
therefore affected by the presence of natural resources, with areas that are rich in natural 
resources being able to generate more income, which might increase inequalities between 
areas. 
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3.2 Local Government Fiscal Capability 
 
Local government budgets (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD) can be divided 
into two categories, the part that is generated from each kabupaten, PAD (as discussed above), 
and the part that comes from the central government (see below). Local governments remain 
largely dependent on the central government to fund their expenditures. In 2011, for example, 
the Ministry of Finance estimated that the central government accounted for 91% of all 
revenue collected and 64% of direct spending by districts. 
 
The central government distributes unconditional block funds (dana alokasi umum or DAU) to 
the regions using a formula accounting for both needs and economic potential DAU are the 
main mechanism through which the central government provides funds to finance provincial 
and kabupaten government expenditures in Indonesia (Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita, 2012). In 
addition, in an attempt to reduce inequalities between regions, poorer provinces and kabupaten 
are eligible for additional grants from the central government. These include specific allocation 
funds (dana alokasi khusus or DAK), Special Autonomy grants for Aceh, Papua and West 
Papua, adjustment compensation funds (dana penyesuaian or DP), and regional incentive funds 
(dana insentif daerah or DID) and grants (hibah) (Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita, 2012). DAK are 
intended to influence local government spending on areas of national priority, and account for 
6% of central transfers and fund 5% of subnational expenditures. While DP provide special ad 
hoc assistance. According to Ministry of Finance and World Bank estimates for 2009, DAU 
represent the main source of revenue for local governments with a share of 49% of total 
revenues; while 18% come from DAK and only 17% from PAD. 
 
According to the World Bank (2011), the current system used for funding transfers is 
inadequate in reducing inequalities between regions as its allocation mechanisms insufficiently 
differentiate between the needs and challenges in different areas. An additional problem with 
DAU is that under its current allocation mechanism, kabupaten have incentives to split off into 
new regions (Harjowiryono, 2011), which is known as pemekaran. Indeed, the wrong incentives 
are given by Indonesia’s grant disbursement mechanism: “two new kabupaten get effectively 
twice as much as the larger old kabupaten from which they were formed” (Fitriani, Hofman, 
and Kaiser, 2005). Table 1 shows that between 2001 and 2011, while the number of new 
kabupaten has slightly more than doubled in South Kalimantan, the amount of DAU received 
has been multiplied by more than five. Thus, it is unsurprising that over the past decade, the 
number of provinces in Indonesia has increased from 26 to 33 and the number of kabupaten 
from 290 to 497. This is largely due to vertical coalitions of politicians at the provincial and 
local levels (Kimura, 2007).  
 
Table 1. Kabupaten Splits and Central Government Transfers  
in South Kalimantan and Yogyakarta 
Source: Harjowiryono, 2011; Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita, 2012. 
 
Province 
Number of 
Kabupaten/Kota in 
2001 
Number of 
Kabupaten/Kota in 
2011 
Total DAU for 
Kabupaten in 
2001 (billion 
Rp) 
Total DAU for 
Kabupaten in 
2011 (billion 
Rp) 
Percentage 
Change in 
DAU: 2001–
2011 
South 
Kalimantan 6 14 0.9 5.5 528 % 
Yogyakarta 5 5 0.9 2.7 216 % 
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The increasing number of kabupaten has led to a notable increase in civil servant spending for 
the central government (see below). Furthermore, it is more difficult to monitor a larger 
number of kabupaten. A study from SMERU shows that financial accountability appears to be 
decreased with pemekaran; there is no consolidated record of the total amount spent in all 
provinces and kabupaten (Isdijoso, 2012).  
 
 
3.3 Public Service Delivery Performance 
 
Service delivery improves in decentralized settings if citizen participation and public sector 
accountability go hand-in-hand with the decentralization of decision-making for public 
services (Huther and Shah, 1998). However, decentralization policy initiatives are often 
undertaken without paying enough attention to improvements in service delivery (Robinson, 
2007). The World Bank (2005) argues that one of the main problems that affect public service 
delivery is the lack of capacity of local governments to exercise responsibility over the services 
they are expected to provide. This lack of capacity can be divided into two main categories: 
fiscal and technical. Fiscal capabilities relates to the ability of local governments to raise 
revenue, while technical capacity relates to local governments’ ability to manage and allocate 
their resources. 
 
Fiscal capacity affects the provision of services at the local level, which mostly relates to the 
ability of local governments to complement the funds received by the central government for 
improved services. In the health sector for instance, although central government spending 
has doubled between 2007 and 2013, health insurance coverage, even for the poor, is not 
universal. Local governments complement the national health insurance for the poor program 
(Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, Jamkesmas) with a locally funded health insurance (Jaminan 
Kesehatan Daerah, Jamkesda), for poor households not covered by Jamkesmas. The coverage 
of Jamkesda varies from region to region according to budget constraints, with some areas, 
such as Jakarta and Bali, approaching universal coverage for the poor and other areas still 
failing to cover a large part of this population. In the education sector, Kabupaten Bandung in 
West Java spent nearly Rp250 million in addition to funds provided by the central government 
in 2008, while Kabupaten Mamuju Utara in West Sulawesi allocated less than Rp40 million for 
education in the same year. These different levels of kabupaten spending are likely to lead to 
different outcomes for the populations of different areas, although there is a mismatch 
between spending from local government and service delivery outcomes (World Bank, 2011). 
 
In addition to a different fiscal capacity for local spending, there are also large inequalities in 
terms of technical capacity across regions. As a result, for instance, sectoral allocation decisions 
are not always aligned with service delivery needs. Due to their lack of capacity, local 
governments often remain largely dependent on the central government, not only for funding 
but also for the implementation of infrastructure projects. In the infrastructure sector, for 
instance, which is key to develop access to markets, off-farm employment and social services 
(Balisacan, Pernia, and Asra, 2002), local governments’ lack of technical capacity in carrying out 
large-scale projects has led to insufficient progress in terms of access to roads, 
telecommunication, and even electricity. About two-thirds of the villages in the country, 
particularly in eastern Indonesia, still have no access to telecommunication networks 
(Aswicahyono and Friawan, 2008). Similarly, electricity access remains low, with wide disparities 
across provinces. Over 70 million Indonesians (over 20% of the population) still do not have 
access to electricity. 
 
In addition, local governments’ performance in delivering public services to their constituents is 
further hindered by the absence of transparent lines of authority and clear accountability for 
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policy implementation. As per Heywood and Harahap (2009), there has been little increase in 
the potential for discretion at the kabupaten level in managing public funds for health. They argue 
that this is likely to be an important reason for the lack of improvement in publicly funded 
health services. Key decisions regarding the amount and use of funds are still made by the 
central government, and as a result no one is held accountable for the performance of the 
sectors—the kabupaten government blames the central government, and vice versa, leaving no 
actor accountable to the population. The World Bank (2003b) has expressed concerns that the 
maintenance of some existing infrastructure projects has suffered a downturn due to unclear 
assignment of government responsibilities and shortcomings in intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. 
 
Lastly, spending on services is increasingly crowded out by significant amounts spent on local 
government apparatus. According to 2011 estimates from the National Secretariat of the 
Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Seknas Fitra), 298 out of 491 kabupaten spent 
over 50% of their total budget on wage expenditures. In 2012, this number increased to 302 
out of 491 kabupaten spending over 50% of their total budget on wages. This is an inefficient 
use of funds as less is allocated to improving public services and poverty reduction efforts 
with sustainable and multiplier effects. 
 
 
3.4 Governance Aspects of Decentralization 
 
Good governance has been shown to be crucial for achieving better public service 
management and delivery, enhancing economic growth, as well as increasing economic, 
political, and social opportunities for the poor (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Arifianto, 2004; 
Blaxhall, 2000; Eid, 2000; Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson, 2000). In the context of 
decentralization, Crook and Sverrisson (2001) show that it has positive effects only in 
countries with well-established public participation schemes, where local governments apply 
the principles of good governance and where there are functioning checks and balances 
mechanisms from both the central government and the general public. According to the 
World Bank (2006), decentralization in Indonesia took place in the absence of a 
comprehensive policy framework. The Indonesian system therefore lacks some of the 
requirements in terms of governance for an effective management of the decentralization 
process, which can have unintended consequences, among which the most harmful for 
poverty reduction are violence and conflict. 
 
Political decentralization is regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and 
ensuring local cultural and political autonomy (Bardhan, 2002). McLaughlin and Perdana 
(2010) find low levels of reported electoral conflict and conflict stemming from the abuse of 
local power in Indonesia, and conclude that decentralization has not brought a notable 
increase in violence, with few locations in Indonesia suffering from high levels of ethnic or 
religious conflict. However, there is a link between administrative decentralization and 
conflict. The International Crisis Group argues that in some areas conflict is a by-product of 
the pemekaran process, especially when decisions are made without public consultation (ICG, 
2005). In West Sulawesi, for example, conflict erupted over the formation of the new district 
of Mamasa, with some members of the community supporting the administrative changes and 
others bitterly opposing them. The report argues that the Mamasa incident is an example of 
what can happen when there is no clear procedure to resolve disputes in the pemekaran 
process. An open democratic procedure is therefore needed to reduce the probability of 
conflict occurring.  
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Further, Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2008) find that the probability of routine violence is higher 
in kabupaten where local public spending is lower. Despite the uniform implementation of 
fiscal decentralization, experiences at the subnational vary and overall decentralization has led 
to an increase in inequalities, with 80% of shared taxes and natural resource-based revenues 
accruing to the richest 20% of the kabupaten.  
 
 
3.5 Kabupaten Institutional Capacity for Poverty Reduction 
 
In 2005 a presidential regulation was issued to encourage kabupaten governments to establish 
Local Coordinating Teams for Poverty Reduction (Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan 
Kemiskinan Daerah, TKPKD) with the objective of overseeing and coordinating the design 
and implementation of local poverty reduction strategies. The main responsibilities of 
TKPKDs include the management and development of local poverty indicators, the 
development of a poverty information system, and the establishment of an early warning 
system on poverty issues. With these responsibilities, members of TKPKDs include the bupati 
or walikota (head of the kabupaten or kota [city]), technical local government departments (dinas) 
such as that of health, education, community empowerment, and the kabupaten BPS offices. 
The distribution map of TKPKD offices across kabupaten is given in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of TKPKD offices across kabupaten 
 
Several challenges exist in utilizing TKPKD as a tool for poverty reduction. First, as of 2010 about 
20% of kabupaten had not established a TKPKD; of which nearly half of are located in the eastern 
part of the country. In addition, the degree by which existing TKPKD are institutionalized varies 
widely across kabupaten.  
 
 
Figure 5. TKPKD and poverty reduction 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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The success of TKPKD in contributing to local poverty reduction efforts depends on a 
number of intertwined factors. First, the support from the local elite, especially from the bupati 
or walikota and from members of local parliaments, is crucial in fostering the role of TKPKDs. 
Second, funds for the operational costs of TKPKDs are often limited, regardless of the fiscal 
capacity of local governments. Third, local governments and therefore TKPKDs have varying 
capacities for program planning and budgeting, and the presidential regulation does not 
address how local governments can increase their capacity. Between 2005 and 2010, several 
regulations have been issued, reforming the composition and role of TKPKDs. In 2010, the 
National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) was established to 
coordinate and oversee the national poverty reduction strategy, similar to the TKPKDs in the 
kabupaten.  
 
TNP2K is also in charge of supporting and developing the capacity of TKPKDs, in order to 
foster their institutionalization and enhance their ability to plan and implement local poverty 
reduction programs and policies. However, there is a high local government staff turnover, 
which causes difficulties in maintaining a focal point for mainstreaming poverty reduction 
initiatives. Some local governments, like in Central Java Province or Kabupaten Indramayu, 
understand the importance of continuity, and issue regulations to minimize the rotation of 
civil servants across local government departments.  
 
 
 
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
 
In examining differences in poverty reduction at a subnational level, Balisacan, Pernia, and 
Asra (2002) highlight several advantages of using Indonesia as a case study. First, Indonesia is 
highly diverse in terms of its geography, institutional attributes and economic performance. 
This diversity allows for critical assessment of the influence of economy-wide policies and 
initial” conditions in 2005, including institutions and geographic attributes related to poverty. 
Second, cross-sectional and time series data is available at subnational units (province and 
kabupaten), which allows for the analysis of the determinants of growth and poverty reduction 
at the kabupaten level. In contrast to Baliscan, Pernia, and Asra (2002) who examined 
Indonesia in the 1990s, this paper will utilize mainly consistent kabupaten-level data for the 
period of 2005 to 2009 to uncover trends that will help explain the socioeconomic 
heterogeneity across Indonesia. 
 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 
In order to empirically assess the determinants of poverty in Indonesia, we use a kabupaten-
level panel dataset with annual observations for the period of 2005 to 2010. Table A1 in the 
appendix provides an overview of the data sources, the time period for which the various 
variables are available, and, where applicable, problematic aspects of the data as well as 
adjustments that we have made in response to these problems. A general challenge in 
constructing the database arises from Indonesia’s post-Suharto decentralization legislation and 
the related formation of new kabupaten. This process, known as pemekaran, led to an increase in 
the number of kabupaten from 440 in 2005, to 497 in 2010. We therefore realign the data to 
match the 2005 kabupaten borders in order to achieve a uniform data set throughout the 440 
kabupaten. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Besides the mean, maximum, and minimum values, the 
standard deviation is decomposed into its between and within components, that is, (i) the 
variation across kabupaten in a given year (between); and (ii) the variation within kabupaten over 
time (within). Some of the structural kabupaten characteristics we are interested in do not vary 
substantially over the sample period (education, demographics, infrastructure, institutional 
quality), which restricts our econometric options. Before turning to the regression analysis, we 
take a closer look at the regional and local heterogeneities in poverty levels and trends. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Kabupaten-Level Panel Data Set, 2005–2010 
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
Total population 2640 5.05 0.1 41.1 5.74 5.74 0.01 
Population density  2640 10.65 0.0 205.0 24.97 25.00 0.02 
Share of urban population 2640 0.351 0 1 0.319 0.319 0.000 
Ethnic diversity (more than 1 
ethnicity, village survey or 
Podes) 
2640 0.734 0.07 1 0.232 0.222 0.067 
 
O
th
er
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Share of villages with asphalt 
main road 2640 0.636 0 1 0.284 0.279 0.055 
Primary health care facility easy 
to reach 2640 0.944 0 1 0.107 0.095 0.051 
Police station easy to reach 2640 0.848 0 1 0.188 0.178 0.061 
Share of village heads with no 
secondary education 2640 0.099 0 1 0.157 0.150 0.049 
Recent history of large-scale 
extended violence 2640 0.232 0 1 0.422 0.422 0.000 
 
Variable n Mean Min Max 
Standard Deviation 
Overall Between Within 
So
ci
al
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Poverty head count 2640 18.44 2.1 63.5 10.52 10.07 3.08 
Poverty gap 2640 3.38 0.0 22.3 2.74 2.47 1.20 
Gini coefficient (based on 
household consumption) 2640 27.07 13.1 62.0 4.45 3.29 2.99 
Average years of education 2640 7.64 4.5 12.9 1.08 1.03 0.34 
Share of population with primary 
education 2640 0.816 0.18 0.93 0.076 0.074 0.017 
Share of population with junior 
secondary education 2640 0.394 0.04 0.72 0.117 0.114 0.027 
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Real GDP, per capita 2640 0.858 0.06 20.91 1.380 1.371 0.163 
Agriculture, share of GDP 2640 0.323 0.00 0.85 0.188 0.187 0.023 
Mining, share of GDP 2640 0.068 0.00 0.95 0.160 0.159 0.017 
Share of workers in agriculture 2640 0.482 0.00 1.00 0.251 0.250 0.025 
Share of workers in mining 2640 0.017 0.00 0.37 0.036 0.036 0.007 
Unemployment rate, total 1760 0.073 0.00 0.22 0.039 0.036 0.014 
Underemployment rate, total 1760 0.357 0.07 0.91 0.130 0.122 0.046 
Annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita 2640 0.062 -0.40 0.87 0.043 0.022 0.037 
Total fiscal revenues, per capita 2604 0.244 0.01 3.20 0.315 0.300 0.098 
Total fiscal revenues, as share of 
GDP 2604 0.444 0.01 5.45 0.560 0.543 0.136 
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Table 3. Provincial Overview: Poverty in 2005 and 2010—Headcount  
and Poverty Gap 
Province 
Poverty Head Count Poverty Gap 
2005 2010 Change 2005 2010 Change 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 28.2 23.4 -4.8 5.3 4.2 -1.1 
North Sumatra 17.6 14.4 -3.2 3.1 2.3 -0.7 
West Sumatra 13.7 11.6 -2.1 2.2 1.8 -0.4 
Riau 15.7 13.1 -2.6 3.1 2.4 -0.7 
Jambi 14.7 10.6 -4.1 2.2 1.5 -0.7 
South Sumatra 25.0 18.2 -6.8 4.5 3.0 -1.5 
Bengkulu 26.1 20.0 -6.1 4.7 3.5 -1.2 
Lampung 24.3 21.3 -3.0 4.8 3.8 -1.0 
Bangka-Belitung Islands 13.4 9.8 -3.5 2.7 1.4 -1.3 
Riau Islands 13.4 11.3 -2.1 2.9 1.9 -1.0 
DKI Jakarta 4.8 5.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.1 
West Java 16.1 14.3 -1.8 3.1 2.2 -0.9 
Central Java 24.4 19.4 -4.9 4.5 3.3 -1.2 
DI Yogyakarta 21.6 18.3 -3.3 4.4 2.6 -1.7 
East Java 23.6 17.7 -5.9 4.5 2.9 -1.6 
Banten 11.7 10.5 -1.2 2.0 1.7 -0.3 
Bali 8.4 7.3 -1.2 1.2 1.1 -0.1 
West Nusa Tenggara 30.0 25.1 -5.0 5.9 4.5 -1.5 
East Nusa Tenggara 32.3 25.7 -6.7 7.0 4.9 -2.0 
West Kalimantan 17.3 11.5 -5.9 3.0 1.8 -1.2 
Central Kalimantan 14.1 10.0 -4.1 2.1 1.6 -0.6 
South Kalimantan 9.0 7.6 -1.4 1.5 1.1 -0.4 
East Kalimantan 13.3 11.1 -2.2 2.8 2.1 -0.7 
North Sulawesi 11.8 12.7 0.9 2.1 2.1 0.0 
Central Sulawesi 25.8 21.1 -4.7 5.1 4.0 -1.1 
South Sulawesi 16.3 14.0 -2.3 2.8 2.3 -0.4 
Southeast Sulawesi 24.7 20.0 -4.7 4.7 3.4 -1.3 
Gorontalo 34.9 19.9 -15.0 7.8 3.4 -4.4 
West Sulawesi 20.7 17.8 -2.9 0.0 2.8 2.8 
Maluku 37.6 31.8 -5.8 8.4 7.0 -1.4 
North Maluku 17.3 12.8 -4.6 2.7 2.2 -0.5 
West Papua 41.3 40.8 -0.4 8.1 11.9 3.8 
Papua 46.6 38.3 -8.3 12.9 9.2 -3.6 
National Level 21.1 16.9 -4.2 4.0 2.8 -1.2 
 
Table 3 provides a provincial-level overview of the poverty headcount and the poverty gap in 
2005 and 2010, respectively. On average, the incidence of poverty has decreased by 4.2 
percentage points from 21.1% in 2005 to 16.9% in 2010; in the same period, the poverty gap 
was reduced from 4.0 to 2.8. At the provincial level, however, there are substantial variations. 
For instance, all provinces (with the exception of West Papua) with poverty rates above 30% 
in 2005 were able to reduce poverty by at least five percentage points, with the highest 
reduction in poverty observed for the province of Gorontalo. The absolute reductions in 
poverty tend to be lowest for provinces with lower levels of poverty in 2005. The underlying 
trend of convergence in poverty levels is confirmed when plotting changes in the poverty 
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headcount and poverty gap respectively against the 2005 levels of these indicators for the 440 
kabupaten in the sample (see Figures 6 and 7 respectively). While an overall negative correlation 
between the initial levels of poverty and the changes over time is observed, the graphs also 
illustrate substantial deviations from this general trend and hence point to diverging local 
experiences across the archipelago.  
 
 
Figure 6. Convergence in poverty rates—poverty headcount 
 
 
Figure 7. Convergence in poverty rates—poverty gap 
 
Table A2 in the appendix further shows that there are substantial correlations between some 
of the socioeconomic control variables. This implies a choice to be made on the inclusion of 
the most relevant correlates of poverty to avoid potential issues of multicollinearity. In 
particular, we do not include measures of labor market participation and local infrastructure, 
which are highly correlated with per capita GDP and with the share of urban population.
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4.3 Econometric Approach 
 
In order to exploit the longitudinal dimension of the dataset, we run panel regression 
models on poverty incidence and severity, respectively. As a number of our control variables 
show relatively low variation over the 2005–2010 sample period,1 a Random Effects (RE) 
model is applied at first. The RE model allows us to account for unobserved kabupaten 
heterogeneity that might affect poverty levels beyond the observable explanatory factors 
and, at the same time, to include the control variables which either exhibit low variation 
over time or are time-invariant. The flexibility of the RE model relies on the rather strong 
assumption of orthogonality between the kabupaten-specific random effect and the 
explanatory variables. For comparison and robustness, we therefore also run fixed effects 
(FE) models using a reduced set of time-varying control variables. The introduction of fixed 
effects allows capturing kabupaten-specific underlying cultural values, as well as other time-
invariant or long-term, slowly changing determinants of poverty. Note that we forego the 
inclusion of time (year) dummies for this analysis. In capturing the overall positive 
development in Indonesia in recent years, time dummies absorb substantial parts of the 
variation in poverty in our sample. We are mainly interested in identifying general 
correlations between poverty and socioeconomic conditions, which we at least partly 
eliminate through the introduction of time dummies.  
 
Lastly, we estimate standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the absolute changes 
in the poverty headcount and the poverty gap between 2005 and 2010, controlling for initial 
conditions in 2005 as well as changes in explanatory factors over this period. As the 
observations within kabupaten are likely to be interdependent over time, we cluster the 
standard errors at kabupaten level to allow for such intragroup correlation.  
 
Given the complex and often reciprocal links between poverty and other socioeconomic 
conditions, it is important to note that we do not claim to provide causal explanations, but 
rather aim to describe the relationship between the local environment and the prevalence of 
poverty. The analysis aims to further our understanding of the factors related to local poverty 
(reduction) in a decentralized Indonesia. 
 
 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
 
Table 4 presents the main regression results at kabupaten level for both random and fixed 
effect models. We use a balanced panel of 434 kabupaten over the six-year period of 2005 to 
2010.2 In regression (1) on the poverty headcount, we only include a core set of control 
variables. The incidence of poverty is found lower in kabupaten (i) with higher GDP per capita 
(ii) with a higher share of fiscal revenues; (iii) with a higher average educational attainment; (iv) 
with a larger share of local leaders with completed secondary education (as a proxy for the 
quality of local governance); and (v) with a higher share of urban population.  
  
                                                            
1See intra-kabupaten standard deviations reported in Table 2. 
2The six kabupaten of the Special Capital Region (DKI) of Jakarta are excluded, given its distinct characteristics 
and the lack of data on fiscal revenues. 
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Table 4. Regression Results: The Determinants of Poverty at the Kabupaten Level 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Poverty Headcount Poverty Gap Change HC 
Change 
Gap 
RE RE RE FE RE FE OLS OLS 
Real GDP per 
capita 
(w/o mining) 
-0.80 -0.72 -0.77 -0.37 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 
(0.307) (0.331) (0.150) (0.696) (0.590) (0.758) (0.753) (0.677) 
Fiscal revenues,  
as share of GDP 
-1.99*** -2.63*** -3.54*** -4.99*** -0.97*** -2.01*** 1.97*** 0.90*** 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Education: av. years 
of schooling 
-2.10*** -2.05*** -2.03*** -1.99*** -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.06 -0.10 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.868) (0.482) 
Village heads w/o 
secondary education 
11.81*** 10.13*** 7.77*** 6.56** 1.15 -0.49 5.30** 0.62 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.027) (0.306) (0.719) (0.012) (0.452) 
Share of urban 
population 
-8.90*** -4.02 -4.30  -1.29*  3.29*** -0.22 
(0.000) (0.227) (0.128)  (0.099)  (0.010) (0.643) 
TKPKD active for 1-
2 yearsa 
-1.35*** -1.30*** -1.13*** -1.35*** -0.16** -0.32*** -0.91 -0.18 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (0.169) (0.494) 
TKPKD active for 
more than 3 years 
-3.89*** -3.70*** -3.43*** -3.79*** -0.66*** -0.92*** -1.61** -0.41 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.121) 
Agriculture 
as share of GDP 
 8.61 9.09* 11.27 1.27 1.36   
 (0.156) (0.085) (0.205) (0.339) (0.745)   
Mining as share of 
GDP 
 1.97 4.52 10.91* 0.77 2.95   
 (0.642) (0.229) (0.091) (0.385) (0.293)   
Gini coefficient 
 0.05* 0.04 0.03 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05 0.06** 
 (0.069) (0.132) (0.234) (0.000) (0.000) (0.442) (0.022) 
Recent history of 
large-scale violence 
 6.24*** 4.44***  1.05***  0.52 0.27 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.470) (0.333) 
Region: Sumatraa 
  -2.51***  -0.35*  -0.30 -0.09 
  (0.002)  (0.055)  (0.609) (0.689) 
Region: Kalimantana 
  -10.87***  -2.06***  -2.87*** -1.12*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Region: NTT & NTBa 
  2.08  0.74**  1.15 0.39 
  (0.187)  (0.027)  (0.168) (0.227) 
Region: Sulawesia 
  -2.38**  -0.39*  0.51 -0.04 
  (0.023)  (0.091)  (0.494) (0.878) 
Region: Moluccasa 
  1.89  1.50*  -0.10 0.78 
  (0.569)  (0.072)  (0.944) (0.163) 
Region: Papuaa 
  14.81***  5.80***  3.64** 2.99*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011) (0.000) 
Poverty HC (7) 
/Gap (8)in 2005  
      -0.36*** -0.62*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Share fiscal 
revenues 
Change 2005–2010 
      0.50 -0.50 
      (0.589) (0.161) 
Gini coefficient 
Change 2005–-2010 
      0.07 0.11*** 
      (0.208) (0.000) 
Constant 
39.26*** 31.95*** 33.90*** 31.70*** 4.41*** 5.12*** 1.51 0.73 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.593) (0.485) 
Year Dummies No No No No No No No No 
Observations 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 434 434 
Pseudo-R2 / Adj. R2 
(7)–(8) 0.286 0.300 0.309 0.314 0.128 0.145 0.468 0.516 
Note: P-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at kabupaten level.  
*significant at 10%. 
**significant at 5%. 
***significant at 1%. 
aReference category: Java and Bali.  
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While an expected negative effect of education on poverty is uncontroversial, there are 
different views on the poverty consequences of urbanization. The newer, more optimistic 
view is summarized by Whiting and Unwin (2009), who note that, “greater urbanization in low 
income countries is an essential component of economic development and from this 
perspective is both inevitable and desirable”, and also clearly evident in the World 
Development Report 2009 (World Bank, 2009).  
 
Kabupaten with a relatively larger public budget (compared to the size of the local economy) 
appear to have slightly lower levels of poverty, and this effect appears independent of the 
quality of local governments (when using educational attainment of local leaders as a proxy). 
All else equal, an increase of the average years of schooling by one year is estimated to be 
correlated with a 2.1 percentage point lower poverty rate. On average, poverty levels are found 
to be about nine percentage points higher in rural kabupaten, reflecting a substantial rural-
urban divide.  
 
In order to assess the correlation of the presence of TKPKD offices with poverty levels, we 
include two dummy variables indicating (i) the presence of a TKPKD office for one to two 
years; and (ii) the presence of TKPKD for at least three years. Compared to kabupaten where 
no TKPKD office has been established yet, poverty is found more than one percentage point 
lower in kabupaten with a TKPKD office for at least one year. In addition, the correlation with 
poverty incidence increases with the duration in which a TKPKD office has been established, 
kabupaten with a TKPKD office for at least three years have a poverty incidence lower by 
nearly four percentage points, compared to kabupaten with no TKPKD office.  
 
We then extend the list of control variables with additional economic factors (regression 2). 
Again the incidence of poverty is found lower in kabupaten with higher GDP per capita, albeit 
being statistically insignificant. The importance of the mining sector is not found to be 
correlated with poverty incidence. Likewise, the share of agriculture in kabupaten GDP is not 
significantly correlated with poverty, which is likely to be due the fact the share of urban 
population accounts for the predominance of the agricultural sector in the kabupaten economy.  
 
All else equal, poverty incidence appears slightly higher in kabupaten with higher rates of 
inequality. This finding is consistent as the poverty reduction effect of growth increases with 
regional output, but only will increase at a decreasing rate due to the nonlinear tail effects of 
the distribution of income. Several recent studies have emphasized the importance of 
inequality in determining the responsiveness of poverty to output growth (e.g. Adams, 2004; 
Easterly, 2000; Ravallion, 1997). Based on the specification that the growth elasticity of 
poverty decreases with inequality, Ravallion (1997) econometrically tested the "growth-
elasticity argument" that while low inequality helps the poor share in the benefits of growth it 
also exposes them to the costs of contraction. In essence, our results suggest that the poverty 
reduction effect of output growth may occur in part through inequality reduction effects. 
 
Finally, a recent history of large-scale violence appears to be high and positively correlated 
with poverty incidence. Controlling for a wide range of socioeconomic control variables, the 
poverty headcount is estimated to be about six percentage points higher in provinces affected 
by large-scale violence in the early years of the country’s political and economic transition. The 
direction of causality is unclear, as it cannot be ruled out that areas with (persistently) high 
levels of poverty might be particularly prone to violence, or that areas that experience high 
levels of violence have performed less well in reducing poverty. One set of theories stresses 
the role that political repression, or what are sometimes called “grievance” factors, play in 
driving regional conflicts. In this view, ethnic groups that experience discrimination should be 
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the most likely to organize armed insurrections against the state, and conflicts should be most 
likely to erupt in undemocratic states and those with pronounced social divisions. A second 
set of theories focuses on economic conditions as paramount, rather than political factors. In 
other words, in this view, rising poverty and falling incomes are the factors most likely to 
spark civil conflicts. This may either be because poverty breeds armed violence aimed at 
looting assets and natural resources, or alternatively because poor areas simply have limited 
institutional capacity to repress armed uprisings.  
 
To ensure that our results are not driven by structural differences between major regions, we 
also introduce regional dummies (regression 3), with the islands of Java and Bali as the 
reference category. This also allows us to account for regional-specific characteristics that are 
constant over time, such as sociocultural norms or habits. The results for the other control 
variables appear mostly unchanged, suggesting that different degrees of poverty within regions 
are mainly related to the same factors that explain the overall heterogeneity in poverty at 
national level. Further, the regional dummies provide evidence on the overall spatial trends in 
poverty. While the interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward, as the factors 
driving these regional differences are unknown, the strong coefficients observed in particular 
for Kalimantan (ceteris paribus, poverty levels are 11 percentage points lower as compared to 
Java/Bali) and Papua (ceteris paribus, poverty levels 14 percentage points higher as compared 
to Java/Bali) suggest that factors other than the socioeconomic conditions we control for 
considerably shape poverty outcomes in these regions. 
 
The appropriateness of the RE model relative to the more restrictive fixed-effects (FE) model 
can be assessed using the Hausman specification test. The null hypothesis of consistent 
estimates from the RE model is rejected, which implies that the use of the FE model is more 
appropriate. We therefore assess the robustness of the findings on the determinants of the 
poverty headcount by estimating an FE model (regression 4). The time-invariant control 
variables (urbanization, conflict history, regional dummies) are excluded from the FE model, 
which focuses solely on the within-kabupaten evolution of poverty over time. The results from 
the RE estimations, which uses time-invariant control variables, in particular urban location 
and recent conflict history, provide a valuable complement to the FE estimates3, and are 
largely confirmed. In particular, the incidence of poverty remains about four percentage points 
lower in kabupaten with a TKPKD office operating for at least three years. The negative 
correlation between fiscal revenues and poverty incidence also appears more strongly 
supported. The main difference with the RE results is that the share of mining in the GDP 
becomes significant, suggesting a higher poverty incidence by nearly 11 percentage points with 
the increase of the contribution of the mining sector to the kabupaten GDP. 
 
Regressions (5) and (6) report the RE and FE results on the determinants of the poverty gap, 
respectively. Whereas the same control variables as for the poverty headcount analysis are 
included, we obtain a somewhat different picture of the determinants of the intensity of 
poverty. In line with expectations, higher inequality in consumption contributes to a higher 
poverty gap. The estimated effect is rather marginal though, with a change in the Gini 
coefficient by one standard deviation (4.45) leading to an increase of the poverty gap by 0.11 
standard deviations.  
 
Similar to the results for poverty incidence, rural areas and provinces with a recent history of 
conflict are generally more affected by severe poverty. Moreover, a relatively high level of 
fiscal revenues compared to the size of the economy is linked to lower levels of poverty depth, 
                                                            
3The same holds for the regressions on the poverty gap; the Hausman test confirms the suitability of the FE 
model. 
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with a standard deviation (0.55) increase in the share of fiscal revenues leading to a decrease of 
the poverty gap by 0.2 standard deviations. The existence of a TKPKD office also reduces 
poverty severity. However, the difference between the offices established for one to two years 
and those established for at least three years is smaller than was the case for poverty incidence. 
Finally, poverty severity is found to be uncorrelated with the educational achievements of local 
leaders, whereas the average schooling years have a negative and significant correlation with 
lower poverty severity.  
 
Lastly, we consider the absolute changes in kabupaten-level poverty (headcount and gap) 
between 2005 and 2010 (regressions 7 and 8) and assess the factors that explain the recent 
changes in poverty indicators. We estimate standard OLS regressions and include the core 
control variables used in previous regressions, both in levels (2005 values) and in the form of 
changes over this period, where appropriate. Some general trends appear to hold for both the 
poverty headcount and the poverty gap. The phenomenon of converging poverty levels is 
strongly confirmed by the significantly negative coefficients associated with the 2005 baseline 
levels of poverty. The higher the poverty headcount and the poverty gap in 2005, the larger 
the reduction in these measures observed between 2005 and 2010. Beyond the socioeconomic 
factors controlled for, kabupaten in Kalimantan appear particularly successful in reducing 
poverty, while the opposite is observed for the Papua provinces. The reduction of the 
incidence of poverty is found more prominent in urban areas, whereas no such relation is 
observed for the poverty gap. Similarly, the existence of TKPKD offices is linked to larger 
decreases in the poverty headcount (1.6 percentage points in kabupaten with offices operating 
for at least three years), but not the poverty gap. Reductions in the poverty gap seem more 
contingent on income distribution and low levels of consumption inequality. 
 
Surprisingly, a higher initial share of fiscal revenues appears to be linked to less success in 
poverty reduction. Further investigation into the role of fiscal revenues for poverty 
reduction reveals this correlation to be nonlinear in nature. Up to a moderate level of fiscal 
revenues, a relatively larger public budget contributes to the reduction of poverty; however, 
kabupaten in which fiscal revenues represent 50% or more of the size of the local economy 
seem to have been less successful in mitigating poverty over the 2005 to 2010 period (results 
not reported). 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this paper, we consider the heterogeneity in the evolution of poverty over time across 
Indonesian kabupaten in the context of the fast decentralization that has been implemented 
since the Asian financial crisis. Our econometrics results suggest that the different 
experiences of kabupaten in reducing poverty between 2005 and 2010 is related to the local 
GDP per capita, the availability of resources to fund public expenditures, the effectiveness 
of service delivery, the quality of governance, and the institutional capacity to implement 
poverty reduction policies of kabupaten. Furthermore, regional heterogeneity in poverty 
across Indonesia appears to be related to the level of education, existence of conflict, and 
degree of urbanization.  
 
We find poverty incidence to be lower in kabupaten with higher GDP per capita output, higher 
average educational attainment, a larger share of local leaders with secondary education and a 
higher degree of urbanization. Regional output per capita was a major factor behind falling 
poverty, with inequality, nevertheless, having a statistically significant effect on poverty across 
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all kabupaten in Indonesia. There appears to be a positive link between inequality and poverty, 
suggesting that a successful poverty reduction strategy requires both economic growth and a 
sound redistribution policy. 
 
Our finding is consistent with previous studies which have generally revealed that GDP per 
capita as an important means for reducing poverty. This result is especially true when 
income distributions are relatively stable over time, as output per capita has the general 
effect of raising incomes for all members of society, including the poor. On average, poverty 
levels are generally found around 14 percentage points higher in rural kabupaten, reflecting a 
substantial rural-urban divide. The share of fiscal revenues in kabupaten GDP has a 
significant negative correlation with poverty incidence and severity. Kabupaten institutional 
capacity in carrying out poverty reduction initiatives appears to be a strong and consistent 
predictor for the evolution of poverty over time. Compared to kabupaten where no TKPKD 
office has been established yet, poverty is found significantly lower in kabupaten with active 
TKPKD offices. As we expected, the positive correlation with poverty reduction increases 
over time, with a four percentage point lower poverty headcount in kabupaten where a 
TKPKD office has been active for at least three years.  
 
In addition, substantially higher poverty incidence and severity is found in kabupaten with a 
recent history of large-scale violence, although the direction of causality remains to be 
established. Poverty reduction in Indonesia therefore appears to be confronted with several 
challenges related to the decentralization process. The main challenge is the limited capacity 
and resources of local governments to develop and implement a poverty reduction strategy, 
and to provide good public services. Secondly, decentralization in Indonesia occurred too 
quickly and therefore lacked a comprehensive policy framework. The positive correlation of 
the establishment of TKPKD offices suggests that there are opportunities to reverse trends 
and address institutional barriers to effective decentralization. Using a similar model as the 
TKPKD, a more comprehensive policy framework which contributes to clarify the lines of 
responsibilities and accountability in the delivery of public services can, for instance, be 
developed and implemented to support the reduction of poverty at a similar pace across the 
country. 
 
In summary, the principle message that emerges from the study is that that regional output, 
poverty reduction, and income distribution are strongly interrelated, so a successful 
development strategy requires effective, region-specific combinations of growth and 
distribution policies. Rapid and sustainable regional economic output is viewed as the primary 
vehicle for poverty reduction. The fundamental proposition is that if poor and lagging 
kabupaten in Indonesia increase their economic output rapidly enough and their income 
distributions are not unusually skewed against the poor, poverty reduction should occur.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1. Data Sources and Problematic Issues 
Variable Source Years Available 
Comments / Problematic 
Aspects 
RGDP  
(kabupaten-level GDP data) BPS 2005–2010 --- 
Unemployment/ 
underemployment,  
Workers per sector 
National Labor Force 
Survey (Sakernas) 
(July) 
2007–2010 
Representative at kabupaten 
level from 2007 onwards; 
disaggregation by sex and/or 
age not possible.  
Workers per sector Sakernas (July) 2005–2010 
Disaggregation by sector may 
not be representative for small 
kabupaten. 
Fiscal revenues 
Regional Financial 
Information System 
(SIKD), Finance 
Ministry 
2005–2010 
Data is missing entirely for 
Jakarta, as there is only one 
budget for DKI (no kabupaten 
budgets). 
Household expenditure, 
poverty rates, inequality, 
average years of education, 
enrolment rates 
National Socioeconomic 
Survey (Susenas) 2005–2010 
Data for Papua and Aceh 
missing in 2005 (2004–2006 
average used instead).  
2008 data not suitable for panel 
analysis (2007–2009 average 
used instead). 
Population figures Susenas 2005–2010 
Structural break in 2008;  2006 
baseline figures used instead. 
Disaggregation by age (e.g. 
share of young population) 
problematic. 
Local Coordinating Team for 
Poverty Reduction (TKPKD) 
TNP2K (National Team 
for the Acceleration of 
Poverty Reduction) 
2005–2011 --- 
Local infrastructure (roads, 
public services) and 
institutions (village head 
education level, police stations 
and security posts), ethnic 
diversity 
Village Census (Podes) 
BPS 2005, 2008 --- 
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